EXPLANING SUBNATIONAL BICAMERALISM IN RUSSIA (EXEMPLIFIED BY THE SVERDLOVSK REGION)

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22394/2304-3369-2022-6-5-21

Keywords:

бикамерализм, парламент, анализ соответствия, Свердловская область, неоинституционализм, теория рационального выбора, диффузная теория, исторический институционализм, «критические моменты», Эдуард Россель

Abstract

The issue of bicameralism is one of the main research areas in the framework of legislative studies due to the spread of bicameral national parliaments in the world. Despite bicameralism at the subnational level in in- dividual countries, political scientists underestimate this topic. How can we explain the creation of regional bicameral assemblies? This article is devoted to the search for an answer to this question. Post-Soviet Russia with its nine subjects, where the second chambers of legislative assemblies were established, is a kind of nat- ural laboratory to analyze the reasons of subnational bicameralism. To achieve this goal, the author chose the congruence analysis as part of the case study. The congruence analysis involves performing several steps:

  • consideration of several theories explaining the creation of political institutions; 2) selection of a case for studying; 3) verification of the explanatory power of theoretical The conceptual basis of the research was neo-institutionalism and its main directions – rational choice theory, sociological institution-


alism and diffusion theory in particular. The region with a bicameral legislature, which became the object of the research, was the Sverdlovsk region. The article examines the origin of the idea of bicameralism and the establishment of a second chamber in the region. As a result of the conducted research, the author came to the conclusion that the rational choice theory has a weak force in explaining subnational bicameralism. It is shown that the creation of a bicameral regional legislature is the result of the consequences of national historical processes and circumstances. The idea of creating a second chamber was taken from the constitu- tional projects of 1992-1993 and/or foreign practice of state power organization.

Author Biography

  • Ruslan S. Mukhametov, Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin

    Ph.D. of Political Sciences, Associate Professor; Ural Federal University named after the first President of Russia B.N. Yeltsin (19, Mira St., Ekaterinburg, 620002, Russia); muhametov.ru@mail.ru. RSCI AuthorID: 538787, ORCID: 0000-0002-5175-8300, ResearcherID: M-7158-2016

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Published

2022-12-24

Issue

Section

Government and public administration

How to Cite

Mukhametov, R. S. (2022). EXPLANING SUBNATIONAL BICAMERALISM IN RUSSIA (EXEMPLIFIED BY THE SVERDLOVSK REGION). Management Issues, 79(6), 5-21. https://doi.org/10.22394/2304-3369-2022-6-5-21